[Download] "Kerman v. City of New York" by 2003 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit August Term ~ Book PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Kerman v. City of New York
- Author : 2003 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit August Term
- Release Date : January 28, 2004
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 104 KB
Description
This case returns to us after proceedings on remand following an appeal in which we, inter alia, reversed district judges dismissals as a matter of law, on the ground of qualified immunity, of certain claims brought by plaintiff Robert Kerman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant William Crossan (styled "John Crossin" in the caption), a New York City police officer, in connection with Crossans order that Kerman be detained and taken to a hospital for psychiatric observation, see Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Kerman II"), affg in part and revg in part Kerman v. City of New York, No. 96 Civ. 7865 (LMM), 1999 WL 509527 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999) ("Kerman I"). Kerman now appeals (a) from so much of the final judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, following a retrial before Robert P. Patterson, Jr., Judge, as dismissed his Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim against Crossan, as well as his parallel state-law false imprisonment claims against Crossan and defendant City of New York ("City"), for unlawful detention and involuntary hospitalization; and (b) from a postjudgment order (i) denying, on the ground that Crossan is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, Kermans motion to correct the judgment in light of the jurys finding that Crossan had ordered Kermans detention and involuntary hospitalization without probable cause, and (ii) denying Kermans motion for a new trial as to damages for that deprivation of his liberty. On appeal, Kerman contends principally that the district court erred in ruling that Crossan was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law (1) because, there being no new evidence material to that issue, such a ruling was foreclosed by the Kerman II holding that Crossan was not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, (2) because Crossan waived his qualified immunity defense by not pursuing it at trial, and (3) because the ruling was based on factual findings by the district court that usurped the function of the jury. Kerman also contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial as to damages on his unlawful seizure and false imprisonment claims, given the jurys refusal to award more than nominal damages despite its finding that he had been deprived of his liberty without probable cause. Finding substantial merit in most of Kermans contentions, we reverse so much of the judgment as dismissed the above claims, and we remand for a new trial as to damages on those claims.